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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at analysing the effectiveness and the efficiency of social 
public expenditure in 22 European countries. We present a basic theoretical 
framework connecting the choice of the level of social protection to the median 
voter’s preferences and the inefficiency of expenditure. To test it against real 
data, we construct performance and efficiency indicators. While the existing 
literature measures the performance of social policy restricting the analysis to 
its impact on inequality and the labour market, our index summarises the 
outcomes achieved in all sectors of social protection (family, health, labour 
market elderly, disabled, unemployment, inequality). Based on this, we find 
that the ranking of countries differs from those found in the literature. We then 
put together performance and the amount of expenditure needed to achieve it 
(to better compare countries, we use social public expenditure net of tax and 
transfers), constructing efficiency indicators and a production possibility 
frontier through the FHD method. We find that efficiency is not related to the 
size of public intervention. Rather, our results suggest that population size and 
the type of the welfare system might be more relevant factors: small countries 
tend to be more efficient than large ones and targeting all sectors of social 
policy tends to be more efficient than concentrating on some areas only. 
 
 
JEL classification: H11; H53; I3. 
Keywords: Median Voter Model; Social Performance Index; Social Expenditure 
Efficiency; Free Disposable Hull; Production Possibility Frontier 
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1. Introduction 
The effectiveness and efficiency of social public expenditure in European 
countries has been the object of political and theoretical debate along the 
convergence path undergone by national welfare systems (Mandl et al., 2008). 
This is taking place as an effect of common factors, like the economic crisis, an 
ageing population, and the working of European guidelines.  
Within this debate, the aim of this paper is to study the outcomes and the 
efficiency of social policies in European countries as they appear in 2013, the 
last year for which it is possible to obtain data for a fairly large number of 
countries (22). We do this through three contributions to the existing literature. 
First, we present a basic median voter model that connects the choice of social 
benefits level to the efficiency of social expenditure and to preferences for 
private goods and welfare services. Coherently with the risk protection 
function of welfare systems, we assume that the relative weight of publicly 
provided social protection services within the utility function increases as the 
individual moves down the income distribution.  
Second, we construct an aggregate indicator for social protection performance, 
meaning for that the achievement degree of social policy goals. The bulk of the 
existing literature on the performance and efficiency of the public sector 
considers either general government expenditure (see, among others, Afonso 
and Kazemi, 2017; Afonso et al., 2005; Tanzi, 1998; Tanzi and Schuknecht, 
2000) or expenditure for specific public services (Clements, 2002; Deprins et 
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al., 1984; Vanden Eeckhaut et al., 1993; Fakin and Crombrugghe, 1997; Gupta 
and Verhoeven, 2001), while studies addressing welfare states typically restrict 
the analysis of their impacts on three areas: economic growth; poverty and 
inequality; labour market rigidities (Boeri, 2002; Sapir, 2005; Caruana, 2010). 
The performance index we present, instead, summarises the outcomes achieved 
in all sectors of social protection, as specified in the OECD Social Expenditure 
Database (SOCX): family, health, labour market, elderly, disabled, 
unemployment, and inequality. 
Third, we analyse social public expenditure efficiency: putting together 
performance and expenditure needed to achieve it, we construct efficiency 
indicators for the 22 European countries in 2013; then, using the performance 
indexes in a Free Disposal Hull (FDH) analysis, we construct a possibility 
frontier and derive country scores for input and output efficiency. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework; 
the performance index and the inefficiency index are derived and tested against 
the predictions of the models in sections 3 and 4, respectively; section 5 
extends the efficiency analysis through the FHD method. Section 6 summarises 
the main results of the paper. 
   
2. The theoretical framework 
We consider a basic median voter model.
1
 The economy is composed by N 
                                                                    
1
 Even if we consider a closed economy, our references are the models in Brueckner 
(2000) and Razin and Sadka (2005). 
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individuals, who differ as for preferences and income endowments. The 
government provides social protection and finances it through taxation. The 
choice of the level of welfare services is the result of the maximisation of the 
median voter’s utility function. 
2.1 The government 
The government provides welfare services. For simplicity, these are considered 
as a composite good of unitary cost and price. Each beneficiary receives an 
amount g, that can thus be interpreted either as a vector of services
2
 or as the 
implicit income deriving from it.  
Let us call Ñ the number of beneficiaries and  the corresponding share of 
population receiving welfare benefits. The number of people receiving welfare 
benefits and the amount of assistance paid are determined by eligibility and 
entitlement rules. 
According to the definitions in Saunders (1991), eligibility derives from the 
specification of the categories of the population qualifying for consideration for 
assistance; entitlement, instead, refers to the set of rules that determine the 
amount of benefits received by those who are eligible, according to some 
claimant’s characteristics.3 
In our framework, the amount of benefits is the same for all recipients. Thus, 
                                                                    
2
 These services can be either “categorical” cash transfers (for instance, old age, 
unemployed, disabled), or services having the characteristics of pure public goods (for 
instance, in the areas of health, inequality, labour market, family). 
3
 For the effects on eligibility and entitlement rules in the health care sector see Swann 
(2010). 
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we will call  the eligibility parameter, defining the share of the population 
eligible for the provision of social assistance. The case of  applies to a 
welfare system providing social services to all individuals, while  
corresponds to a welfare system targeting only some categories of the 
population, based on exogenously given eligibility criteria. Changes in the 
amount of social protection that each beneficiary is entitled to receive are, 
instead, represented by a change in the level of g. Total welfare services 
provided will thus amount to g  
This can differ from the amount needed to finance them, because of 
inefficiencies in the transfer process. These can stem from the spending side, 
that is, some resources are wasted in the process of being distributed to 
beneficiaries,
4
 and from the revenue side, that is, funds are collected by means 
of distortionary taxation. In what follows, we concentrate on inefficiency in 
expenditure. 
Thus, total welfare expenditure is given by 
,   (1) 
where  is the inefficiency parameter. The case of  corresponds to an 
efficient provision of welfare services, while  will exceed 1 in the presence of 
waste, a higher level of  corresponding to a larger waste. 
                                                                    
4
 When the production/provision is not realised at the minimum cost. See, for 
example, the public choice literature, in particular the seminal work by Migué and 
Bélanger (1974). 
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Welfare benefits are financed by means of a fixed tax and the government 
budget constraint imposes that total revenues, R, equal total expenditure, S: 
   (2) 
As for the individual contribution, we distinguish two cases. 
Case 1. All N individuals pay the fixed tax. Then, given eqns. (1) and (2), the 
welfare cost for each individual, T, is given by: 
    (3) 
Case 2. Those who are eligible for receiving welfare services do not contribute. 
Note that this case applies only if  ; then, the individual contribution paid 
by the fraction (1-  of the population will be given by: 
    (3’) 
2.2 The individual utility function 
We assume that individual utility depends on g and on disposable income, that 
is, income net of the flat tax raised by the government to finance welfare 
expenditure. We assume that each individual i maximises the following Cobb-
Douglas utility function: 
,   (4) 
where  is individual i’s income, considered exogenous.5 
                                                                    
5
 For welfare recipients, T would equal 0 in case 2. 
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Note that g enters the utility function irrespective of whether the individual 
directly receives welfare services or not. This feature intends to capture the risk 
reducing function of welfare systems, connected to the ability of the 
government to handle moral hazard problems better than private companies in 
providing income insurance (see, for instance, Buchanan and Tullock, 1965; 
Sinn, 1995).
6
 
Individuals differ as for  and . In particular, we assume that  depends on 
the relative position of the individual within income distribution, being 
positively correlated to the ratio . Let us assume that: 
 
where  is the upper bound level of the first decile (i.e., the 10% of people 
with lowest incomes). Thus, the relative weight of g within the utility function 
increases as the individual moves down the income distribution. 
This is in line with the risk protection function of the welfare system 
mentioned above and with the suggestion that individuals become increasingly 
risk averse as they move closer to poverty (Wagstaff, 2000; Marduch, 1995). 
2.3. The government maximisation problem 
The level of g is decided by majority voting; thus, the government maximises 
the median voter’s utility function subject to the budget constraint (eqn. (2)): 
                                                                    
6
 Different explanations are altruism, that is, concern for others, through the 
interdependence of the utility functions (Mishan, 1972) or the intent of ensuring social 
cohesion (Brennan, 1973). 
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  (5) 
s.t. eqn. (2) 
where m denotes the median voter. 
Since  its value increases as the median voter’s income comes 
closer to .  
The connection between welfare expenditure and the distribution of income 
that this implies is different from the one analysed in the political economy 
literature. As suggested in Downs (1957) and Meltzer and Richard (1981), 
majority voting can explain redistributive expenditure on the basis of the shape 
of the income distribution. 
Typically, the bulk of the distribution consists of many small incomes, with 
some very large incomes in its extended tail. Thus, the median voter income 
will be less than that of the mean voter, with majority voting leading to 
redistribution from the richer minority to the poorer majority.
7
 
In our model, redistribution is not the driving force, since the median voter 
need not be among the net beneficiaries of the system.
8
 The position in the 
distribution of income, instead, is relevant for determining the intensity of 
preferences according to the insurance motive. 
                                                                    
7
 See also Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994); for recent 
theoretical extensions and empirical tests, see, among others, Milanovic, 2000, and 
Barnes, 2013. 
8
 This feature can, however, be captured in case 2, if the median voter belongs to the 
targeted categories and therefore benefits from welfare expenditure without 
contributing to it. 
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2.3.1 The optimal solution 
We consider two cases of the maximisation problem. 
Case 1 
In case 1, T is given by eqn. (3); by using it and substituting from the budget 
constraint (2) into (5), one obtains the following objective function, W: 
.   
 (6) 
By applying a log-linear transformation, eqn. (6) becomes: 
  
 (7) 
The F.O.C. is:
9
 
 
that yields: 
.      (8) 
Case 2 
In case 2, T is given by eqn. (3’); by using it and substituting from the budget 
constraint (2) into (5), the objective function becomes: 
                                                                    
9
 The F.O.C. is sufficient for a maximum, given the usual assumptions on the 
concavity of the utility function and the linearity of the constraint. 
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.    (6’) 
By taking logs as above, the F.O.C. yields: 
.     
 (8’) 
Based on these results, one can state the following claims. 
Claim 1. The equilibrium amount of welfare services to which each beneficiary 
is entitled increases as the ratio between the upper bound income level of the 
first decile and the median voter’s income increases. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward by inspection of eqns. (8) and (8’), 
recalling that , which increases with . Intuitively, the claim 
points out that social preferences are more oriented towards social protection 
services in societies with higher concentration in the lower tail of income 
distribution.
10
 
Claim 2. The equilibrium level of g increases in the median voter’s income, 
. 
Proof. Let . So, we have . Thus,   The 
same obtains by differentiating eqn. (8’). An increase in  has a composite 
effect on the amount of social protection g*. As the median income increases, 
                                                                    
10
 On the contrary, social preferences are more oriented towards private goods in 
societies with a greater concentration in the upper tail. 
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km decreases, with a negative effect on g* (claim 1); however, there is also a 
positive direct effect, which prevails, thus generating a net increase of g*. 
Conceptually, this means that social protection is a normal good and the 
demand for it increases with income. 
Claim 3. The equilibrium level of g is inversely related to the inefficiency 
parameter  and to the eligibility parameter . 
Proof. The proof is straightforward by inspection of eqns. (8) and (8’). 
Proposition 1. The values of the inefficiency parameter  and of the eligibility 
parameter  are inversely related at the optimum; the elasticity of  w.r.t.  is, 
in absolute value, equal to 1 in case 1 and smaller than 1 in case 2. 
Proof. The proof of the first part of the proposition is straightforward by 
inspection of eqn. (8) and eqn. (8’), respectively. As for the second part, in case 
1, taking the total differential of eqn. (8), one obtains ; this means 
that  and  are perfect substitutes, since a greater inefficiency can be 
compensated by an equal reduction in  In case 2, taking the total differential 
of eqn. (8’), one obtains . This is because a percentage change 
in the share of beneficiaries corresponds to an opposite one in the share of tax-
payers; thus, an increase in   is compensated by a decrease in  that is smaller 
than in case 1. 
Claim (3) and proposition (1) present a simple illustration of how a reduction 
in social security expenditure can be achieved in either of the following ways: 
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a) by improving efficiency (reduction of ); b) by restricting eligibility 
(reduction of ); c) by reducing the level of individual protection (reduction in 
g), which, if the amount of assistance received could vary across recipients, 
e.g. based on their income level, would correspond to a tightening in the 
entitlement rules. 
Nowadays, in the face of budgetary pressures, governments are resorting to 
income and/or means testing to guarantee social support to the least well-off 
(Adema et al., 2014), following ways b) and c). Individual means test is 
referred to as selectivity; in its broader sense, the term also encompasses the 
narrowing of the scope of eligible categories. An alternative concept is that of 
targeting, implying the redirection of expenditure to those whose needs are 
greatest or whose means are lowest (Saunders, 1991). 
These measures are commonly associated to an improved efficacy of policies, 
also hinting at an improved efficiency in the use of resources. This conclusion 
should, however, be taken with cautiousness: first, selectivity and targeting are 
not always successful (Gouyette and Pestieau, 1999); second, they can possibly 
be used as a substitute for waste reduction, if governments are unwilling or 
unable to improve efficiency (proposition 1). 
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3. Testing the model against empirical evidence: outcome indicators 
for social policy 
In this section, we want to test the previous model against empirical evidences. 
To this purpose, we use OECD and Eurostat data to calculate, first, a social 
protection performance index (SPPI) representing the outcomes produced by 
welfare policies in 22 European countries in the year 2013.
11
 In general, social 
policy is a multidimensional policy when considering several sectors of action. 
In addition to categorical measures, providing benefits to selected categories of 
beneficiaries only (e.g., for old age, the disabled, the unemployed), there are 
more general policies with non-excludable benefits (labour market, health, 
income inequality, family).
12
  
In this perspective, following Antonelli and De Bonis (2015), we first identify 
eight sectors indicators for seven areas of social protection expenditure
13
: 
family, health, labour market, elderly, disabled, unemployment, inequality. 
Then, we select outcomes indicators for each sector. These outcomes can also 
be interpreted as the achievement’s degree of the targets set out by policy-
makers for different social areas. As a second step, we construct a composite 
index, summarising all outcomes indicators and, therefore, representing the 
                                                                    
11
 We use the most recent available data where the 2013 data is missing. 
12
 See note 2. 
13
 The expenditures sectors are those included in the SOCX database. We use eight 
indicators because we consider poverty as an additional indicator for social policies 
(see Appendix). 
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social benefit provided – on average – to citizens (the  in the theoretical 
framework).  
For each sector, we consider the following outcomes indicators correlated to 
the overall goal of the social policy in that sector:
 14
 
 maternal employment and net disposable family income for the family 
sector, since the related policies are mainly oriented towards 
reconciling work and family life - thus encouraging a greater women’s 
participation in the labour market - and providing tax benefits 
(deductions and tax credits) or monetary transfers to families with 
children, to support their income level and, ultimately, in order not to 
discourage births; 
 life-expectancy at birth for the health sector; 
 the unemployment rate (in the three types of general, female and youth 
unemployment rate) to assess the performance of active labour market 
policies, that is, all those initiatives (such as training, work-related 
education, apprenticeships, careers guidance tools, etc.) designed to 
promote employment and work placement; 
 the net replacement rate, i.e. the proportion of labour income (net of 
fiscal measures) which the national welfare systems respectively 
                                                                    
14
 See the Appendix for details. 
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guarantee to the elderly and the unemployed after their exit from the 
labour market; 
 the monetary benefits that, on average, national governments provide to 
the disabled (in the form of disability pensions or monetary transfers, to 
pay medical expenses and for care and assistance); 
 the Gini index calculated based on after-tax and transfers disposable 
income for income inequality; 
 the poverty index (calculated as the percentage of households with 
disposable incomes
15
 at least 60 percent lower than the median national 
income) is considered as an indicator of the effectiveness of social 
policies aimed at ensuring a given standard of living. 
3.1 Calculating the Social Protection Performance Index (SPPI) 
Our performance index for the i
th
 country and j
th
 sector of social policy at time 
t is thus given by: 
                                10
tj,min,tj,max,
tj,min,,,
,, 



xx
xx
=P
tji
tji                                    
  i=1, 2...22     j= 1, 2,.....8 
where xi,j,t is the value of the outcome indicator associated to the sector j of 
social policy in country i at time t, while xmin,j,t and xmax,j,t represent, 
                                                                    
15
 The OECD “Income distribution and poverty” database refers to the “equivalised 
disposable household income”, that is, household income net of taxes and inclusive of 
transfers received adjusted for household composition based on equivalence scales. 
18 
 
E-PFRP N. 32 
2018 
 
respectively, the minimum and maximum values for the same indicator within 
the group of the 22 countries under consideration. Therefore, the performance 
index ranges between 0 and 1. Pi,j,t = 0 indicates the case in which the i
th
 
country exhibits the worst performance in the j
th
 sector at time t within the 
group of countries under consideration; conversely, Pi,j,t = 1 represents the best 
outcome in the j
th
 sector at time t for the i
th
 country
16
. 
For the sectors with several outcomes’ indicators (for example family, labour 
market, elderly, unemployment, etc.)
17
, we consider their average value, 
following the methodology used in calculating the Human Development 
Indices.
18
 Finally, the aggregate indicator for the whole area of the social sector 
was obtained by adding together the individual partial indicators in accordance 
with the existing literature (Tanzi et al. 2000, 2006).
19
 For country i at time t 
we thus have: 



8
1
,,,
j
tjiti PSPPI  
                                                                    
16
 To ensure that the highest values of the index are representative of the best 
performances, we transform three variables: the unemployment rate, the poverty index 
and the Gini index. In these cases, higher values of the index would indicate worse – 
and not better – performances for the country concerned. We therefore consider the 
complement to one of the preceding three outcome variables interpretable as the 
employment rate, a “welfare index” (representative of the percentage of households 
with disposable income of over 60 percent of the median disposable income) and an 
index of equidistribution of disposable income, respectively. 
17
 See Appendix. 
18
 Methodological notes available at the following link. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/calculating-indices. 
19
 We give equal weight to each sector indicator in compiling the aggregate 
performance indicator; the assumption is strong, but stronger alternatives are lacking. 
It facilitates the comparison with the existing literature, where either the same 
assumption is made (Afonso et al., 2005) or some sectors are not considered at all 
(thus being assigned a zero weight).  
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Tab. 1 The Social Protection Performance Index (2013) 
  Family Health 
Labour 
market 
Old 
Age 
Unemployment Disability 
Income 
inequality 
(Gini 
index) 
Poverty 
Final Index 
2013 
Country                   
                    
Austria 0,71546 0,73333 0,57357 0,78301 0,95459 0,27485 0,69231 0,71852 5,44563 
Belgium 0,62240 0,66667 0,77395 0,31540 0,75814 0,29220 0,79487 0,44444 4,66809 
Czech 
Republic 
0,16766 0,34667 0,67284 0,44560 0,81737 0,02246 0,84615 0,90370 4,22247 
Denmark 0,75796 0,62667 0,76844 0,75061 0,88648 0,67877 0,91453 0,88148 6,26494 
Estonia 0,21755 0,21333 0,48165 0,35513 0,80454 0,05139 0,00000 0,00000 2,12361 
Finland 0,62046 0,72000 0,58828 0,35330 0,80750 0,46712 0,84615 0,71852 5,12133 
France 0,57597 0,88000 0,66917 0,41993 0,72162 0,21753 0,57265 0,71111 4,76798 
Germany 0,60792 0,69333 0,69123 0,17665 0,97927 0,30079 0,58974 0,63704 4,67597 
Greece 0,18520 0,76000 0,06802 0,54095 0,00000 0,01775 0,15385 0,23704 1,96281 
Hungary 0,01661 0,00000 0,53313 0,89364 0,69398 0,00000 0,61538 0,51111 3,26386 
Ireland 0,34385 0,72000 0,44121 0,09413 0,65647 0,06867 0,44444 0,59259 3,36137 
Italy 0,23254 0,94667 0,69307 0,66748 0,51234 0,09884 0,30769 0,31111 3,76974 
Luxembourg 0,82886 0,82667 1,00000 0,51223 0,87858 0,79827 0,68376 0,60741 6,13577 
Netherlands 0,79851 0,76000 0,75925 1,00000 0,91412 0,32221 0,69231 0,69630 5,94269 
Norway 0,73652 0,81333 0,70593 0,40159 1,00000 1,00000 0,93162 0,75556 6,34456 
Poland 0,22776 0,18667 0,29230 0,24694 0,67522 0,01699 0,52137 0,48889 2,65613 
Portugal 0,44781 0,68000 0,88242 0,45477 0,45508 0,07558 0,16239 0,30370 3,46175 
Slovak 
Republic 
0,04866 0,10667 0,64343 0,72555 0,53998 0,04050 0,78632 0,76296 3,65407 
Slovenia 0,55499 0,62667 0,86220 0,29279 0,73445 0,02904 0,90598 0,62222 4,62833 
Spain 0,30206 1,00000 0,69307 0,61064 0,08687 0,09320 0,12821 0,08889 3,00292 
Sweden 0,78848 0,84000 0,44305 0,35147 0,76703 0,55008 0,68376 0,54815 4,97201 
United 
Kingdom 
0,56318 0,72000 0,00000 0,00000 0,80849 0,10657 0,02564 0,49630 2,72018 
Source: Our elaborations on OECD and Eurostat Data  
 
The final values are characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity within the 
group of countries considered, ranging from 1.96 (Greece) to 6.34 (Norway). 
Higher indicators (greater than the median value 4.43) are associated with the 
Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden) 
and Luxembourg, Austria, France, Germany, Belgium and Slovenia. 
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The disaggregated analysis of the index shows diversity in its composition. 
Performance levels of the “family”, “health”, “unemployment”, “income 
inequality” and “poverty” sectors are higher in the Nordic systems (Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands) and in some continental countries, notably 
Luxembourg. In the Mediterranean countries, in contrast, the better-performing 
components are represented by “health” and “the elderly”, while markedly 
poor performances are highlighted by context indicators relating to the fight 
against poverty and to policies reducing income inequality. Anglo-Saxon 
countries perform well in the unemployment and poverty sectors.  
3.2 Performance, median income and distribution 
Eqns. (8) and (8’) imply that g is directly related to kYm. Given that 
, km increases with . This ratio corresponds to the inverse of 
the percentile ratio P50/P10, among the common measures of inequality, 
basically representing a distributional parameter (see claim 1). 
Fig. 1 shows the relationship between our SPPI for the year 2013 and the 
average value of the product between the percentile ratio and the median 
income for the period 2009-2013 for the countries under consideration.
20
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
20
 We take the average value of Ym(P10/P50) for the period 2009-2013 to consider the 
lag between the outcome of social policies in a given year and the expenditure 
decisions of previous years. 
21 
 
E-PFRP N. 32 
2018 
 
Fig. 1 The Social Protection Performance Index and income distribution 
 
Source: Our elaborations on OECD data (SOCX Database). Median income in PPP (US 
dollars) 
 
What emerges is a positive relationship, which hints at an explanation of 
differences in national choices about the level of protection based on 
differences in the level and the position in the distribution of the median 
voter’s income. This can be connected both to the redistribution and the 
insurance motives outlined in the previous section. Since the main objective of 
the paper is to analyse efficiency in social expenditure, we do not elaborate 
further on this finding,
 21
 turning, instead, to the analysis of social expenditure 
efficiency. 
 
4. The inefficiency parameter  
Our next step is to calculate the inefficiency parameter represented by  in the 
                                                                    
21
 Additional results are available upon request. 
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theoretical framework. Since the per capita social expenditure is , the value 
of  is simply given by  divided by , estimated in the previous section. 
From a conceptual point of view, we are calculating the ratio between the input 
of social policy (expenditure) and the output (the SPPI). 
As an estimate for , we take per capita net public social expenditure, as a 
share of GDP. In particular, we assume a lagged effect from expenditure onto 
performance: we thus take the average value of per capita net social 
expenditure over the period 2009-2013.
22
  
We can now obtain an estimate of  computing an indicator for social 
expenditure inefficiency for each country, SEIIi. To do this, we weigh the 
logarithm of average per capita net social expenditure, NPSEi, by SPPIi:
 23
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
22
 At constant prices. The method is similar to the one applied in Afonso et al. (2005), 
therefore most of their caveats also apply. Thus, we are aware that public expenditure 
data are not always fully comparable among countries and that its impact on 
performance cannot be always separated by that of other factors. Note that the existing 
literature uses gross social expenditure; instead, by using net social expenditure, we 
can correct for differences across countries stemming from different taxation levels on 
social benefits. 
23
 The values of the indexes only give an ordering of countries. 
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Table 2. The Social Expenditure Inefficiency Index (2013) 
Country SEII 
    
Austria 1,688766 
Belgium 1,978171 
Czech 
Republic 2,032466 
Denmark 1,467653 
Estonia 3,838971 
Finland 1,769576 
France 1,943538 
Germany 1,962848 
Greece  3,330452 
Hungary 2,578343 
Ireland 2,705011 
Italy 2,390322 
Luxembourg 1,581171 
Netherlands 1,53085 
Norway 1,467002 
Poland 3,093786 
Portugal 2,511969 
Slovak 
Republic 2,283473 
Slovenia 1,869697 
Spain 2,982955 
Sweden  1,839119 
United 
Kingdom 3,300212 
 
 
The final values are characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity within the 
group of countries considered, ranging from 1.47 (Denmark) to 3.83 (Estonia). 
Based on this ranking, one can distinguish three groups of countries: the 
Nordic countries, with Luxembourg and Austria, with the lowest inefficiency 
indexes (between 1,47 and 1,83); the Continental countries, with inefficiency 
parameters between 1,84 and 2,28; the Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon 
countries, with Poland, Hungary and Estonia, with fairly high inefficiency 
parameters (2,39-3,83).  
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Unlike the result for general public expenditure in Afonso et al. (2005, 2010), 
inefficiency in social expenditure is not positively related to the amount of 
spending, as shown in Figure 2.
24
 
Figure 2. The Social Expenditure Inefficiency Index and Net Public Social 
Expenditure (2013) 
 
Source: Our elaborations on OECD Data  
Differently from Boeri (2002), Sapir (2005) and Caruana (2010), Ireland and 
the United Kingdom are at the same levels of inefficiency as the Mediterranean 
countries. As for the new Continental countries, differently from Caruana 
(2010), the Czech Republic and Slovenia do not outperform the Northern 
countries, ranking with the other Continental countries and the Slovak 
Republic (even if Slovenia is quite near to Sweden), while Hungary joins 
Poland at the levels of the Mediterranean countries. This difference, besides the 
different time period under consideration, stems from the different measure of 
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 The same applies to the relationship between the SEII and the ratio of net social 
expenditure to GDP. 
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performance that we adopt, based on the outcomes of a set of social policy 
areas that is wider than those adopted in the above-mentioned literature.
 25
 For 
instance, the lag of the Mediterranean countries w.r.t. the Anglo-Saxon ones in 
the area “unemployment” is compensated by a better performance in the fields 
of “health” (and “the elderly”, as for the United Kingdom). Consequently, we 
believe that a general performance index can better assess the overall effect of 
social protection on social welfare. 
As argued in section 2, a higher level of the inefficiency parameter  should be 
inversely related to . This corresponds to an inverse relationship between the 
SPPI and the SEII. In the perspective of a cross-country comparison, we find 
that countries with an above average (2,14) inefficiency level have a below 
average (4,22) level of performance (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
25
 Boeri (2002) and Sapir (2005) only consider the EU-15 countries and do not use an 
aggregate performance index, thus providing sectorial effectiveness analysis (labour 
market, poverty, redistribution, old age). Caruana (2010) compiles an aggregate 
outcome indicator using a Principal Component Analysis, considering five sectors 
(growth, poverty, inequality, labour market, unemployment). 
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Fig. 3 The relationship between the Social Protection Performance Index 
and the Social Expenditure Inefficiency Index 
 
Source: Our elaborations on OECD Data  
 
5. An efficiency analysis of social expenditure 
Given the results of the previous sections, we now turn to the measure of the 
input and output efficiency of social expenditure, applying the method of the 
FHD analysis.
26
  
The FHD analysis allows to construct a production possibility frontier, against 
which one can rank the individual countries’ efficiency performances. In our 
framework, the performance achieved in the social sector (SPPI) is the output, 
while net social expenditure (NPSE) is the input. Countries on the frontier 
exhibit the highest possible level of performance, given the level of social 
expenditure (alternatively, they use the lowest level of expenditure to achieve a 
                                                                    
26
 The method was first developed by Deprins et al. (1984); for an application to 
general government expenditure, see Afonso et al. (2005). One limit of the method is 
that it does not statistically assess differences across countries.  
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given level of performance); in other words, there exist no other countries that 
obtain the same level of performance with a lower level of expenditure. 
Countries on the frontier are assigned input and output efficiency scores of 1; 
against them, one can measure the relative input and output inefficiency of 
countries that lie inside the frontier. In general, country A is inefficient relative 
to the frontier country B if it achieves a lower performance with a higher (or 
equal) expenditure; the output efficiency score of country A will be given by 
the ratio between its performance and that of country B, while its input 
efficiency score by the ratio between the level of expenditure of country B and 
its own expenditure level. Countries inside the frontier will thus have input and 
output efficiency scores that are smaller than 1. The input efficiency score 
shows how much less they could spend to obtain the same performance level; 
the output efficiency score how much higher their performance could be with 
the same amount of expenditure. Based on these scores, countries can be 
ranked according to their input and output efficiency levels (countries on the 
frontier being all ranked in the first place). 
The production possibility frontiers for our set of countries in 2013 is presented 
in Figure 4. Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia are on the frontier.
27
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 Note that countries on the frontier are efficient in a relative sense, since no other 
country obtains a higher performance with a lower expenditure level. This might 
underestimate inefficiencies. For instance, Estonia and Poland are on the frontier 
though having a relatively high inefficiency index. 
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                  Figure 4. Production possibility frontier (2013) 
 
 
Countries’ efficiency scores and ranks are reported in Table 3.28 For countries 
inside the frontier, input efficiency scores range between 0,51 and 0,92, while 
output efficiency scores between 0,57 and 0,97. The average input efficiency 
score is 0,85 (0,75 if one considers only countries inside the frontier): this 
means that the same performance could be obtained using 85% of actual 
expenditure. The average output efficiency score is 0,86 (0,77 for inefficient 
countries): this means that performance is 14% less than the level that could be 
reached using the actual amount of expenditure.  
Countries with a below than average amount of per capita net public social 
expenditure are only slightly more efficient than those with an above average 
level (among inefficient countries, slightly less efficient). Thus, the inverse 
relationship between expenditure size and efficiency, found for general 
                                                                    
28
 Input efficiency scores are computed based on the absolute values of net public 
social expenditure, PPP US dollars (average 2009-2013). 
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government expenditure (Afonso et al., 2005), does not seem to be confirmed 
for social expenditure. 
Population size appears a more relevant factor in determining efficiency: 
countries with population above the mean (United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Spain, Italy, Poland) exhibit, on average, an input efficiency score (0,78),
29
 
lower than smaller countries (0,87, on average). This might be a consequence 
of higher administrative costs - because of a lower population homogeneity, 
reduced flexibility of the institutional framework, higher information costs 
(Robinson, 1960) - associated to a larger number of beneficiaries, in a context 
where economies of scale are not particularly relevant. 
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 The average value is 0,74 if one only considers countries inside the frontier. 
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Table 3. Efficiency scores and ranks (2013) 
 
Countries FDH 
  input efficiency Rank output efficiency Rank 
Austria 0,90 4 0,87 4 
Belgium 0,84 6 0,75 10 
Czech Republic 1,00 1 1,00 1 
Denmark 1,00 1 1,00 1 
Estonia 1,00 1 1,00 1 
Finland 1,00 1 1,00 1 
France 0,81 7 0,76 8 
Germany 0,89 5 0,79 7 
Greece 0,57 12 0,42 14 
Hungary 0,93 2 0,89 3 
Ireland 0,47 14 0,66 11 
Italy 0,65 13 0,81 6 
Luxembourg 0,60 11 0,97 2 
Netherlands 1,00 1 1,00 1 
Norway 1,00 1 1,00 1 
Poland 1,00 1 1,00 1 
Portugal 0,70 10 0,75 9 
Slovak Republic 1,00 1 1,00 1 
Slovenia 1,00 1 1,00 1 
Spain 0,54 8 0,65 12 
Sweden 0,92 3 0,84 5 
United Kingdom 0,53 9 0,59 13 
Average 
   
  
All  0,83 
 
0,85   
Per capita 
expenditure below 
mean 0,83 
 
0,83   
Population above 
mean 0,74 
 
0,77   
    
  
Inefficient 
countries 
   
  
All 0,72 
 
0,77   
Per capita 
expenditure below 
mean 0,65 
 
0,66   
Population above 
mean 0,68   0,72   
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For countries inside the frontier, input efficiency scores range between 0,47 
(Ireland) and 0,93 (Hungary), while output efficiency scores between 0,42 
(Greece) and 0,97 (Luxembourg). 
Looking at the traditional division of welfare systems, thus excluding post-
communist countries, Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands,Norway) have an average input efficiency score of 0,98 and an 
average output efficiency score of 0,97; central countries (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany and Luxembourg) an average input efficiency score of 0,81 
and an average output efficiency score of 0,83; Mediterranean counties 
(Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 0,62 for input and 0,66 for output 
efficiency; Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and UK) 0,50 for input and 0,63 for 
output efficiency. Post-communist countries exhibit SEII greater than Nordic 
and Continental (except for Slovenia) countries; nevertheless, some of them 
(notably, the small ones) are placed on the frontier, thus obtaining efficiency 
scores of 1. This is not a contradiction, since they are efficient relatively to the 
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries.   
As noted in section 4, the difference with the literature on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of European welfare policies stems from the composition of the 
performance index that we have proposed, based on the outcomes in all the 
main areas specific of social policy. 
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6. Conclusions 
Our theoretical analysis of the relationship between social performance and 
efficiency predicts that the size of social protection increases with the median 
voter’s income level and its proximity to the bottom end of the distribution and 
decreases as the inefficiency of social expenditures increases. These claims are 
supported by the data. 
To test the model, we first constructed performance indexes for 22 European 
countries in 2013. While the literature on the effectiveness and the efficiency 
of welfare systems proposes sectorial analyses, we construct a composite 
performance index (SPPI) based on the outcomes of all main sectors of social 
policy. Then, we calculated an inefficiency index (SEII) as the ratio of net 
social expenditure to the performance index (existing studies use gross social 
expenditure); the efficiency analysis is completed by the construction of a 
production possibility frontier using the FHD method. 
We obtain a ranking of countries not completely in line with those found in the 
literature: for instance, Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries end up being 
quite similar. We also find that, in the field of social protection, efficiency does 
not appear to be inversely related to the size of public intervention. Population 
size and the type of welfare system appear to be more relevant factors in 
determining the effectiveness and efficiency of social expenditure.
30
 These 
                                                                    
30
 Of course, given the difficulties in cross-country data comparability and in 
separating the effect of public expenditure from that of other factors (just take life 
expectancy as an example), all the results are indicative. Also, the 22 countries have 
different levels of private social expenditure; these are limited in general, albeit higher 
in the Nordic countries. 
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findings can be of relevance within the debates on the optimal spatial 
dimension of welfare services (for a review see, among others, Ferrera, 2005; 
Kunzel, 2012) and the link between the characteristics of welfare systems and 
their efficacy and effectiveness, to which we have already referred in the paper: 
by comparing the performance and efficiency rankings, we found that countries 
with higher expenditure efficiency present a greater homogeneity of 
performance in all subsectors considered. 
This might be related to the cross effects of sectorial policies, that thus tend to 
reinforce each other. For instance, a higher expenditure level in support of 
families, like childcare, encourages female participation in the labour market 
and can therefore contribute to reduce poverty and income inequality. As a 
policy implication, the paper suggests that expenditure policy should follow a 
multi-target approach, not devoting resources only to contrast some particular 
social risks, given that some sectorial policies can have indirect positive effects 
on other areas, thus guaranteeing a more efficient use of resources. 
 
Appendix 
Methodological notes and data for outcomes indicators 
This appendix provides some methodological notes on some outcomes’ 
indicators used to calculate the performance index. 
In the paper, we consider 7 sectors of social expenditure (family, health, labour 
market, elderly, disabled, unemployment, inequality) and 8 sector indicators 
(we add poverty) for their related outcomes. 
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Fig. A1 Outcomes Indicators for Social Policies 
 
  
In some cases, the outcomes’ indicators are data (maternal employment, life 
expectancy, unemployment rate, Gini index, poverty index) directly available 
on OECD databases. In other cases, some elaboration was needed. For 
example, for family and disabled, we use monetary amounts considered net of 
fiscal measures and expressed in PPP (US dollar) to make the international 
comparison possible. While for the disabled, we directly use the available 
Eurostat data on the monetary benefits that, on average, national governments 
allocate in the form of disability pensions or monetary transfers,  for the family 
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available income we simulated the net disposable income of a “typical” family 
– which we adopt as a benchmark – consisting of two children and two 
working parents with, respectively, a gross income from employment equal to 
100 percent and 67 percent of the average income from employment in their 
country of residence. Net disposable income is calculated by subtracting the 
income tax (considering deductions or tax credits) and social contributions 
from gross taxable income (adjusted for deductions) and adding monetary 
benefits. For the simulation analysis, the OECD’s tax-benefit calculator model 
(available at the following link: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefitsandwagestax-benefitcalculator.htm) was 
used. The results of the simulation are in Tab. A1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
E-PFRP N. 32 
2018 
 
Tab. A1 Net Family Income (2013) 
Countries 
Net Family income in 
PPP (US dollars) 2013 
    
Austria 64998,75 
Belgium 62648,28 
Czech 
Republic 
32836,91 
Denmark 58836,54 
Estonia 30900,19 
Finland 59222,34 
France 57993,89 
Germany 66490,35 
Greece 49334,96 
Hungary 29814,12 
Ireland 60947,56 
Italy 50506,70 
Luxembourg 84729,00 
Netherlands 71318,07 
Norway 72517,29 
Poland 29406,64 
Portugal 39433,96 
Slovak 
Republic 
28512,05 
Slovenia 37712,85 
Spain 52286,35 
Sweden 60947,32 
United 
Kingdom 
68063,40 
Source: elaboration on OECD tax-benefit calculator data 
 
Other income support policies target groups of individuals who exhibit a 
certain degree of vulnerability, due to life cycle and market risks, within the 
framework of the market economy: the elderly, the unemployed. For each of 
these categories, the benchmark indicator that we have identified is the average 
amount of available resources (therefore net of fiscal measures)
31
 which the 
various national welfare systems guarantee to them. For the elderly, we have 
used the net replacement rate relating to compulsory pension schemes, which 
                                                                    
31
 In all cases, we consider monetary benefits in net terms, i.e. net of fiscal measures (direct 
taxation, resulting from social transfers, indirect taxation of consumption by recipients of 
transfers and tax benefits for social welfare purposes). 
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represents the percentage of individual income, net of contributions and taxes, 
that the pension system guarantees after exiting the job market. Formally, this 
is the ratio of the net pension to the labour income net of tax. Three levels of 
labour income were considered: 50 percent, 100 percent and 150 percent of 
national average labour income (AW) (Tab. A2). 
 
Tab. A2 Net Replacement Rate for Pensions (2013) 
  Net Replacement Rate for pensions (2013) 
  Low earner (0,5 AW) Average earner (AW) High earner (1,5 AW) 
Austria 91,2 90,2 86,2 
Belgium 80,7 62,1 48,3 
Czech Republic 97,8 63,8 50,8 
Denmark 117,5 77,4 67,4 
Estonia 79,7 62,4 55,5 
Finland 71,3 62,8 63,2 
France 75,9 71,4 60,9 
Germany 55,2 57,1 56,1 
Greece 92,5 70,5 65 
Hungary 94,4 95,2 96,1 
Ireland 75,5 44,8 34,6 
Italy 83,9 81,5 83,3 
Luxembourg 87,1 69,4 66,8 
Netherlands 104,8 101,1 97,2 
Norway 91,1 62,8 51,3 
Poland 61,3 59,5 59,1 
Portugal 77,7 67,8 68,4 
Slovak Republic 88,1 85,4 84,7 
Slovenia 63,5 63,3 60,6 
Spain 79,5 80,1 79,8 
Sweden 68,8 55,3 72,9 
United Kingdom 67,2 41,8 30,5 
Source: Pensions at a Glance, OECD Pensions Statistics (database) 
From a methodological point of view, we repeat a simulation analysis to 
calculate the net replacement rate of unemployment benefits during the first 
year of unemployment, which represents the proportion of net labour income 
replaced by net benefits received in the event of unemployment. 
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The latter, in turn, depend on both labour income and the recipient’s family 
situation. Therefore, two income categories were considered (67 percent and 
100 percent of national average labour income) and, within each of them, six 
types of family: three typical families (single parent, single-earner households 
and families with both partners in employment) without children and three 
families of the same types with two underage children (Tab. A3 and Tab. A4). 
In both cases, we consider families which do not qualify for cash housing 
assistance or social assistance while working. 
 
Table A3. Net replacement rates unemployed: case 1 (67% AW) (2013) 
  67% of Average Wage (AW) 
  No children 2 children 
Countries Single person 
One-earner 
married couple 
Two-earner 
married couple 
Lone parents  
One-earner 
married couple 
Two-earner 
married couple 
Austria 55 57 80 71 72 85 
Belgium 90 83 84 95 82 85 
Czech Republic 65 65 87 67 67 88 
Denmark 84 85 92 89 87 92 
Estonia 55 57 77 65 62 79 
Finland 59 59 80 74 69 84 
France 69 65 84 71 68 84 
Germany 59 59 86 81 83 90 
Greece 39 40 68 46 46 70 
Hungary 68 68 84 76 76 87 
Ireland 50 80 75 50 75 81 
Italy 72 76 86 81 78 88 
Luxembourg 83 81 90 90 89 93 
Netherlands 76 77 84 67 81 77 
Norway 68 69 84 79 73 86 
Poland 49 50 75 80 56 76 
Portugal 75 75 93 79 78 94 
Slovak 
Republic 
62 58 85 72 57 86 
Slovenia 86 83 93 85 88 96 
Spain 78 75 89 76 74 88 
Sweden 63 63 81 71 67 83 
United 
Kingdom 
20 31 60 47 56 67 
Source: OECD Benefits and wages statistics http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-
statistics.htm 
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Table A4. Net replacement rates unemployed: case 1 (67% AW) (2013) 
  100% of Average Wage (AW) 
  No children 2 children 
Countries 
Single 
person 
One-earner 
married couple 
Two-earner 
married couple 
Lone 
parents  
One-earner 
married couple 
Two-earner 
married couple 
Austria 55 56 76 67 68 81 
Belgium 67 63 71 74 64 74 
Czech Republic 65 65 83 70 66 89 
Denmark 58 60 75 67 64 76 
Estonia 54 56 73 60 61 74 
Finland 58 58 76 70 65 79 
France 67 67 80 71 68 81 
Germany 59 59 83 71 69 88 
Greece 28 28 57 33 34 59 
Hungary 45 45 67 57 56 72 
Ireland 36 57 63 48 67 69 
Italy 57 60 75 69 69 77 
Luxembourg 85 82 88 93 89 92 
Netherlands 75 77 83 68 81 78 
Norway 65 66 79 76 69 81 
Poland 33 35 60 53 41 62 
Portugal 75 75 95 77 77 98 
Slovak Republic 65 59 82 93 58 84 
Slovenia 68 67 81 77 72 84 
Spain 56 56 74 70 70 82 
Sweden 44 44 67 53 48 68 
United Kingdom 14 22 50 40 48 56 
 
Source: OECD Benefits and wages statistics http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-
statistics.htm. 
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OECD, Tax-benefit calculator available at  
http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/benefitsandwagestax-benefitcalculator.htm 
OECD, Unemployment Data available at  
https://data.oecd.org/unemp/harmonised-unemployment-rate-hur.htm 
OECD, Pensions at Glance- Pensions Statistics available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/data/oecd-pensions-
statistics/pensions-at-a-glance-2 
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OECD, Benefits and wages statistics available at  
http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm 
OECD, Income Distribution and Poverty Database available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD 
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